|
The New Political Hue A look at the impacts of politics on the Green
movement and the Green movement on politics By Joshua Lynch 27 October, 2000
The ecological crisis of Western society has uncovered a fundamental flaw in our current political system. Examining the emergence of the ‘Greens’ in 1970s West Germany may provide us with the solution. |
ContentsIntroduction Part I - Fundamentally Green: A
symbol for new justice The Four Green Pillars 1.
Ecology 2.
Social Responsibility 3.
Grassroots Democracy 4.
Nonviolence Part II. Die Grunen: The Anti-Party
Party i. The Decentralized
Problem - Internal conflict, external skepticism ii. The Inescapable
Compromise - A Red-Green Coalition iii. Die Grunen today –
Green babysteps in fancy shoes Conclusion:
A Green Future |
Introduction
In the last century, we
have witnessed the horrific consequences of despotic oppression. As Eco-political philosopher Robyn
Eckersley points out, high concentration of power into the hands of a
centralized bureaucratic state may be able to represent a larger social and
ecological whole, but cannot be flexible enough to meet the needs of the
local communities (Eckersley 1992, p 177).
However, corruption from a powerful political force is not limited to
the dictatorship model of Hitler’s Third Reich or Communist Russia. Recent history has shown that when an
excess of power is given to corporations in capitalist societies, the
ecological and social inequities both local and global can be enormous. As was the case with many of the social
injustices from tyrannical rule in recent years, this increasing corruption
from consumerism and materialism is being combated by a variety of citizens’
movements. In the late 1970s, one
political voice encompassed the heart of these social uprisings into one
powerful nonviolent force. The
so-called ‘Green movement’ is that voice. In this essay I examine the origins
of the Green movement in West Germany, and their struggle to avoid corruption
and compromise while entering power politics through the worlds’ first successful
Green Party, Die Grunen. Part I - Fundamentally Green: A symbol for new justice When discussing the
upcoming presidential election in the United States, many people tell me that
Green Party candidate Ralph Nader “may know a lot about the environment, but
he wouldn’t have a clue about how to ‘run the economy’ or control the
military.” From the very beginning of
the Green movement, critics have argued that an ecological approach to
politics is too narrow. In today’s political framework decisions are not
typically based on ecological grounds. How can such a specific single-issue
question provide the basis for an entire political agenda? One answer to this question is that the
Greens don’t base their decisions in the typical political framework. Another is that within the Green movement
the concept of ecology is not limited to one of trees and polar bears but
rather, includes the concerns of our entire global habitat. In many Western societies,
post WWII affluence has bred a new type of consumer society run by
increasingly paranoid governments.
Riding the economic benefits of capitalism and touting the freedoms of
small government, this new materialist culture had rarely been questioned
before the emergence of the Greens.
However, this perceived affluence had always come at a high
price. Powerful Cold War governments
and exploitative free-market societies had left vast inequities between and
within nations. For West Germany in the
late 1970’s, this situation led to the emergence of a variety of new social
movements ranging from anti-nuclear to feminist, peace to ecology. These efforts were soon combined into one
Green symbol. Beginning at the
grassroots level, the Greens called themselves the voice of the greater
movement. In his book, The German Greens: A Social and Political
Profile, Werner Hulsberg describes this creation: Repelled by existing socialism, and put off by a revolutionary left which had no understanding for the movements but simply wanted to use them, these movements were radicalized and politicized by the ecological question. Ecology, however, encompassed economy and living conditions, individual and society. (Hulsberg 1988, p 10)” This
union of activists around a common theme can be understood by examining the
anti-nuclear movement. During the
Cold War, there was always the threat of mass-destruction from an all-out
nuclear war between powerful nations.
Angered by this possibility, activists from around the world were
united in a massive peace movement.
The effects of nuclear technology however, also had a strong impact on
the environmental crisis, issues of social justice, and the feminist
movement. The threat of nuclear power
plants leaking or being hit by missiles and creating massive explosions
fueled the movement to protect local workers and citizens, and to keep local
environments safe. Issues of nuclear
waste disposal fueled the fight against environmental discrimination. As a whole, the overwhelming power of men
in the decision-making process surrounding these nuclear issues left many
feminists calling for more equal representation. As evidenced by the dynamic nature of the anti-nuclear
movement, one can see why the Green movement was never solely an ecological
battle. This is a concept that remains widely unnoticed by many
‘environmentalist’ politicians today. The Four Green PillarsAt their ‘foundation congress’ in 1980, the
visionary German Greens established the four basic pillars of ecology, social
responsibility, grassroots democracy, and non-violence upon which the
movement was formed, as their guiding principles. These issues attracted among others, radical socialists,
holistic environmentalists, conservative fundamentalists, and political
realists to the Green movement, each with their own priorities and pragmatic
channels (Kolinsky 1989, p 16). Each member valued the four pillars to a
differently. However, ultimately the
success of the Green movement will depend on the level to which these
founding principles are upheld. The
following gives a description of each of the four fundamental pillars of
Green philosophy. 1. Ecology Beginning in the 1960s with Rachael Carson’s book Silent Spring and The Meadow’s Report,
Limits to Growth, the ecological
crisis of resource depletion, toxic waste, radiation, and air pollution was
exposed to the world. In West
Germany, this crisis brought a whole array of ‘Eco-Greens’, ‘value
conservatives’, and ‘ecological reformists’ to the Green movement. For all of these German Greens, ecology is
valued in a holistic approach.
According to Spretnak and Capra’s book Green Politics: The Global Promise, these principles include
“implications for our politics, our economy, our social structures, our
educational system, our healthcare, our cultural expressions, and our
spirituality.” Consistent with the
principles of ‘deep ecology’, the Greens support ecological solutions such
as; ·
‘soft’ energy production ·
“appropriate technology” ·
“regenerative agriculture” ·
a complete halt to the “ravaging of natural ‘resources’ and our
poisoning of the biosphere through the dumping of toxic wastes, the
accumulation of so-called acceptable levels of radiation exposure, and the
pollution of the air.” (Spretnak 1984, p 29) Naturally, different individuals and
factions within the movement support different methods of achieving these
changes. However, all of Green
politics is driven by the basic principle of ecology, “that everything is
interwoven and that there is no such thing as a first or a second. The German Greens often used the term
‘network science’ or ‘network thinking’ in their political approach. The Green Federal Program describes this
Eco-philosophy. Ecological politics presents an all-encompassing rejection of an economy of exploitation and plundering of natural resources and raw materials, as well as the destructive intervention into the cycles of nature’s household. (Spretnak 1984, p 31) 2. Social Responsibility Typical of the difficulties faced by this
highly diverse and decentralized movement, the concept of social responsibility
provided a lot of strife and confusion between Green factions. The radical-left wanted it to represent a
sort of democratic Marxism. Others
simply wanted it to stand for social justice and an assurance that new
ecological programs designed to restructure the economy would not harm German
workers and citizens. Many visionary
Greens warned of making the same mistakes of Marxist societies by leaning too
far towards centralized programs, even if they were to be democratically
constructed. Part of the fear of
socialist trends in West Germany came from the memory of Hitler’s co-option
of many social themes during his National Socialist Party Campaign. In the Green movement he principles of
social responsibility and an ecological economy are necessarily linked. According to Spretnak and Capra, it is the
“expression of ecological and
social consciousness that is the very essence of Green politics.” (Spretnak 1984, p 34) 3. Grassroots Democracy It is their consistent promotion of grassroots
democracy that sets the Greens so far apart from the rest of contemporary
power politics. Although some
political parties make efforts to encourage voter participation and access to
information, nowhere in representative politics is this concept more
supported than in the Green movement.
The creation of any new democratic political power typically stems out
of one grassroots movement. However,
while these other forces move towards a more centralized hierarchical
decision making process, the Greens maintain ‘decentralized, direct
democracy’ as a major pillar of formalization. As the Green structure was created in West
Germany, the following grassroots principles were promoted: ·
Programs are informed by individual proposals and directed by local
committees. ·
A rotational system for leaders keeps power dispersed. ·
Members often involve themselves in one or more citizens’ movements
on the side to stay in touch with reality.
(Spretnak 1984, p 35-40) These practices contrast with other
existing political structures, which encourage, ·
Top-down control of meetings and other communication (if there is
any). ·
Political leaders who may have entered the system in touch with
reality, but decades in the political ‘bubble’ become confined to searching
for the ‘union vote’, the ‘woman vote’, or even the ‘one-legged Greenie
vote,’ in their search for maximum popularity and power. ·
Members who play golf at an exclusive country club on the side to
stay in touch with reality. Although genuine forms of grassroots
democracy can be very difficult to manage, the potential for public support
of a political system that integrates individual input into the basic
decision making process is indisputable.
This has been one of the most honored virtues of the Greens when
satisfied, and one of the most highly criticized when it is abandoned. 4. Nonviolence In the Green movement, nonviolence is seen as a
critical ingredient of an ecological society. The Greens promote both an end to personal violence, and an end
to ‘structural violence’, which includes many forms of forceful oppression by
the state and other institutions. The
West German Greens promoted self-determination and peace education to teach
the public that “the cult of the soldier is a cultural, not natural,
condition.” The goal has always been
to move away from exploitation and oppression from all sources. (Spretnak 1984, p 40-44) Despite the famous successes of Ghandi and Martin
Luther King Jr. in recent history, for many radical-left Greens, this
principle of nonviolence was seen as limiting. Jurgen Reentz believed that there would come a time when
nonviolence “leads to martyrdom, which makes me fear that one will remain
morally clean in the end but politically without success.” In response, many other Greens argued that
history had shown that violence breeds violence and nonviolent action would
ultimately gain the support of a moral public. (Spretnak 1984, p 40-44) In the recent ‘globalization’ movements in
Seattle, Washington, Prague, and Melbourne the major difficulty with the
concept of nonviolent direct action has either been a lack of pure
nonviolence or distortion of information by a corporate biased media. Fortunately corruption is not easily
hidden in the long-term and the forces of nonviolence appear to be succeeding
for the most part, as police brutality is slowly exposed. This element of the Green movement has
proven vital to the growing individual support, which is the sharpest weapon
that the Greens hold in power politics.
Along with many of the pillars of Green
philosophy, the principle of nonviolence is to a large degree directly at
odds with the their role in institutional politics. Since the role of government is to enforce the law through any means necessary Greens have not been
able to, as Roland Vogt puts it, “fully reconcile the demands of social
responsibility with the demands of nonviolence.” (Spretnak 1984, p 41) As a political force, the Green movement
has assimilated a diverse array of social movements ranging from the
anti-nuclear movement of the Cold War to the modern day globalization
movement. In 1988 Werner Hulsberg
described this dynamic force as follows, The new social movements are totally different from the classical single-issue campaigns which defended the status quo or, in some favorable situation, made some positive gains. These new social movements are comprehensive movements which develop a critique of the system as a whole and which propose new social utopias. This is the essential point that has to be realized. (Hulsberg 1988) In West Germany, the formalization of the Green
movement into mainstream politics began in with the establishment of a Green
Federal Program in 1980. Calling
themselves the political voice of the greater movement, the Greens established
their four basic pillars with a distinctly long-term focus. Using these principles along with a
decentralized structure and a flexible strategy, the Greens would enter the
federal elections as the independent political party, Die Grunen in 1980.
(Kolinsky 1989, p 4) Part II - Die Grunen: The
Anti-Party Party “A political party is an organization that seeks to influence government by running candidates in elections.” (Austin 2000) "I never submitted the whole
system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever, in religion,
in philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where I was capable of
thinking for myself. Such an addiction is the last degradation of a free and
moral agent. If I could not go to Heaven but with a party, I would not go
there at all." – Thomas Jefferson in a letter to Francis Hopkinson,
Paris, Mar. 13, 1789 (Gaber, 1997) Entering the realm of party politics involves an
inevitable sacrifice for any group or individual. Individual autonomy is at least partially compromised for the
will of the party. Furthermore, by
forming a party, another filter is placed between a citizen and their
representative. This corruption does
not necessarily happen all at once however.
In Germany, a unique approach has allowed the Green movement to avoid
this degradation of ethical and representative decision making to some
extent. However, it remains to be
seen whether their core goals and values have remained intact enough to
maintain their fundamental goal of creating an ecological society for their
country. For many Greens, the formation of a
national political party has come reluctantly. In the U.S., presidential candidate Ralph Nader ran as a “Green
Independent” in 1996. In this year’s
elections Nader is running under different Green Party labels in different states
(i.e. the Vermont Progressive/Green Party or the Minnesota Greens). In Australia, Tasmanian Greens and other
Green representatives remained as Green Independents for many years until the
Australian Greens were formed in the mid 1990s. For Australian Senator Bob Brown, the need
to formalize the Green movement came when the ecological crisis could no
longer be left to the major parties, as they were “proven failures.” In his book The Greens, he
described the Green movement as “changing the political direction from
exploitative destruction to sustainable future.” He warned the political
world of “a force building up against greed and the consumer ethos.” (Brown
1996, p 43) In West Germany this
force became Die Grunen, the ‘anti-party party.’ For Die Grunen members, the social movement was not
enough by itself. West Germany was in
a state of ecological and social crisis and parliament was not
listening. As a political organization,
the Greens had the same support base for too long and needed to find a way to
articulate their themes through channels which were seen as legitimate by the
mass public (Kolinsky 1989, p 81).
Seeing as parliament was the paramount mechanism for decision-making
and viewed as the most legitimate form of West German politics, the Greens
saw there to be no choice but to enter the elections as a national party in
1980. Green representative Petra Kelly emphasized
this urgency to the public with classic ‘third party’ rhetoric by saying
that, “in West Germany it is becoming increasingly important to vote for what
we consider right and not just for the lesser evil.” (Hulsberg 1988) Die Grunen coupled this argument with
creative advertising showing the social and environmental impacts of the crisis
in an attempt to win over public sentiment.
Although Germany’s proportional voting system supports minority
parties with proportional representation in parliament for the percentage of
votes won by each party, Die Grunen did not eclipse the minimum of 5% of the
vote needed to gain seats in 1980, but rather only managed a disappointing
1.5%. i. The
Decentralized Problem - Internal conflict, external skepticism Die Grunen had always rejected the
traditional liberal-conservative orientations of power politics with their
famous saying, “We are neither left nor right, but out in front.” This rejection of the status quo has
always given the Greens an edge. They
are the grassroots of a hierarchical government, the social critics of the
political structure, the nonviolent actors of the police state, and the
ecological visionaries of the leaders of industrial society. They are the peoples’ party, the
progressive, radical ecological and social reformers. When taken at their
roots, all four of the Green pillars represent a profound contradiction to
the mainstream motor of contemporary Western politics. To avoid corruption
and sacrifice of their fundamental goals, the Greens have had to remain
decentralized in a centralized political structure. This paradox has led to an assortment of problems for Die
Grunen throughout its history. Problems arose both inside and outside of
the party as members squabbled over organizational and ideological battles
and their constituency grew ever more volatile. It is their diversity and flexibility that has both strengthened
and hindered the German Greens ever since they entered formal politics. Green realists and idealists had fought at
each step along the path of centralization and compromise. On a few occasions, these battles led
Green fundamentalists to abandon the party.
This was the case for Rudolf Bahro who resigned from Die Grunen after
six years of active involvement. Bahro left after the 1985 elections when
the Greens made a serious compromise of animal protection, which he saw as
the last straw in the failure of the political party. In his resignation statement he writes, We are in decline because the people who had placed their hopes in us realized at least when they saw the behavior of the North-Rhine-Westphalian Greens after the Saarland elections, that their course is not a sincere one; they are like everybody else, only they are trying to kid both others and themselves that they are different. (Bahro 1986, p 211) Bahro’s statements outline the added pressures
historically placed on Greens by their critics. Since they claim to represent principles of direct democracy
and decentralization, Green Parties are typically held to a higher standard
of ideological purity than other parties.
Any evidence of corruption and compromise can cause people to lose
trust in the party. In West Germany,
the public had been aware of internal squabbling within Die Grunen for
years. .
Furthermore, Die Grunen’s image problems included the troubles of
being the political voice of a social movement that was perceived by many as
illegitimate. At the time many
supporters had been criticized for being more entrenched in their alternative
culture and attitudes than they were geared to change. These combined factors may explain why
only 15% of Die Grunen supporters considered
their party capable of governing in 1983.
(Kolinsky 1989, p 51) The realist faction within Die Grunen, the so-called
‘realos’, had pushed for serious modification of the party’s ecological and
social demands and significant changes in their structure ever since they
became a party. A poor image amongst
the German public and disappointing election results fueled support for these
‘realo’ arguments. The fundamentalist
Greens, or ‘fundis’, rejected these sacrifices in hopes to keep power
dispersed and idealism alive. As the
years rolled on and Die Grunen support remained below 10% in most areas, the
position of the ‘realos’ most often won out. ii. The Inescapable Compromise – a Red-Green Coalition After the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification
of East and West Germany, Die Grunen formed their first national coalition in
1993 with an alliance of East German civil-rights movements called ‘Bundnis
90’ (European Greens 2000). While
this early coalition could be easily justified on the grounds that they were
simply expanding their traditional flexibility virtue by including the East
German social movements, their 1998 Federal Coalition with the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) was an entirely different story. This so-called red-green alliance of the left-wing
socialists and the grassroots Greens had been suggested by Die Grunen
‘realos’ for years with resistance from other factions. While SPD/Die Grunen alliances had existed
in local politics before, the first regional red-green alliance of the Federal
Republic didn’t occur until 1985 (Hulsberg 1988). As soon as they formed this coalition the German Greens joined
the partisan world of conventional party politics. This initial event led to further regional coalitions and an
increase in voter popularity. This
trend reached its peak in the 1998 elections when the Federal Coalition of
SPD and the Bundis 90/Die Grunen Alliance won control of the German
government. (Germany-Info 1998) This momentous event marked the end of 16
years of Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic Party conservative government,
and the beginning of a new hope for ecological and social reform in
Germany. The very next year, this
red-green coalition won a 19-seat majority in the European Union parliament,
bringing Green politics to the international stage (CSM 1997). However, by this point the German Greens
had already compromised major elements of all four of their original
principles, and were no longer operating purely as the voice for the greater
social movement, but rather as a joint voice for the SPD and a few diminished
Green ideals. A major symptom of the Coalition government has been a
loss in the representation of Green ideals in government. The primary goal of Die Grunen was to
represent the greater movement in parliament. Although democratic representation first became sacrificed when
stated demands of Green members became compromised, this trend was
accelerated dramatically with the red-green coalition. In 1988, Werner Hulsberg wrote, “the
Greens, unlike the SPD, are not a party in which the leadership defends its
own interests as distinct from those of its base.” As junior coalition
partners with SPD, local Green citizens have lost more than half of their
sovereignty in the decision-making process.
The most pungent example
of the difference between the fundamental Die Grunen principles and the
Coalition’s new goals has arrived inside the principle of nonviolence. The Greens’ original philosophy on
nonviolence was an anti-military stance, rejecting the European efforts of
active allied peacekeeping. In 1983,
Die Grunen called for an end to NATO and “for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from the Republic of Germany and, in the long run, from all
countries.” (Hulsberg 1988, p 130) In the SPD/Green
Coalition’s 1999 statements on European Integration, their attitude was much
different. “The new Federal Government regards the Atlantic Alliance as an
indispensable instrument for the stability and security of Europe as well as
for building a lasting European peace order. The door to the Alliance remains
open for other democracies.” (Germany-Info 1998) This discrepancy did not
come solely from SPD influence. Last
year, Die Grunen’s new Federal Coalition Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and
other ‘realos’ were able to convince a majority of Greens in outgoing
parliament to support Germany’s participation in any NATO air strikes on
Serbia (Greenparty 1999). ‘Fundi’ and other
opposition to this kind of abandonment of fundamental demands, has led to
increasing tensions within the party.
This lack of solidarity and agreement results from a clash between the
diversity of strong personalities within the Greens and a basic condition of
party politics. Spretnak and Capra
describe this basic condition as a “lust to destroy; many people get energy
by beating others down.” Joschka
Fischer has been criticized for playing this game a lot within recent
years. Ironically, it seems to be
this conversion that has gained Fischer the most popularity amongst the
German public. Fischer has urged the
party to “modernize its cumbersome decision-making process.” This infuriated “parliamentary whip”
Kerstin Muller who said to a Die Grunen gathering, "we all know that
when the Greens talk of structure reform it's all about a battle for power.”
While Fischer called for new strategies, Muller and many of Fischer’s’
comrades saw these efforts as an attempt to obtain a leadership role within
the party. (Millennium Debate 1999)
German Greens have always boasted of having ‘spokespeople’ instead of
leaders. This power struggle
continues to divide the Greens on many issues. Among the Coalition
proposals that have remained true to fundamental Green values, many have been
either watered down or rejected by the SPD.
Although it remains a priority for Die Grunen, Environment Minister
Jurgen Trittin has fought the anti-nuclear battle with the SPD with little
success. Greenpeace and other
environmental groups have criticized the new government for not establishing
a specific timetable to phase out nuclear power in Germany. (Carter 2000) Last year in the EU, there
was a lot expected of the new red-green presidency in terms of environmental
reform. To their credit, the Germans
were able to establish environmental policy integration strategies for the
fisheries council, the economics and finance sector (ECOFIN), general
affairs, and transport and energy councils with relation to climate change
responsibilities under the Kyoto Protocol.
They also received high marks from the German League for Nature and
Environment (DNR) and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) on their
product policy, chemicals policy, waste prevention, and Eco-efficiency
efforts. (Greger 1999) Despite these positive
efforts, the EEB and the DNR had overall concerns about the German presidency
and were mainly disappointed with their efforts. They criticized the Coalition for being unconcerned with their
smaller European partners and for giving more importance to individuals and companies than to the general welfare
of the public and the economy as a whole.
Their most pivotal criticism was that “in particular, the
environmental principles of environmental liability, the precautionary
principle and high standards of protection - all mainstays of EU environmental
policy - seemed altogether foreign concepts in the lexicon of the German
chancellery.” (Greger 1999) Clearly these results are not what one would
expect from the first-ever partial Green leadership in the EU. iii.
Die Grunen today
– Green babysteps taken in fancy shoes Although compromise has
led to many conflicts and difficulties, all hope has not been lost for the
German Greens. Along the way, many
small victories have been won. The
Greens currently hold Germany’s Foreign, Environment, and Health Ministers
and have been able to achieve some improvements in these areas. Since the
coalition, the principle of an “ecotax” has been established in Germany with
new energy taxes on mineral oil, heating oil, electricity, and gas. Although not always successful, the Greens
continue to fight for peace, human rights, weapons disarmament, civil rights,
and more transparency and participation in the political system. Most
importantly, because of Bundis 90/Die Grunen political leadership in the last
decade, acid rain, nuclear waste, and recycling have become nationally
recognized environmental priorities in Germany. (CSM 1998) Currently, more than
50,000 people are members of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In the early 1980’s, the most autonomy was given to the local
and national levels of the party.
There are now about 2,500 community sections, all of which contain
executive committees of 7-12 members.
The Greens still have spokespeople instead of leaders for each
committee. Most sections of the party
have maintained the rule that elected MP’s are not aloud on the committees.
There continue to be many national and federal working groups amongst the
Greens who assist on a wide range of political issues. There is now a minimum quota of 50% for
women in all bodies and for parliamentary election candidates. A new organization of 14-28 year olds
called the Green Youth has been established with an office in Berlin. (European Greens 2000) Although positive
structural qualities are still very important to the Greens, a lot of
political influence now comes from the popular figure-heads like Joschka
Fischer, as was evidenced by the committee of 400 Greens’ ruling for NATO
intervention in Serbia last year.
Another critical change is that currently the 16 regional sections have
gained considerable autonomy, which provides an extra level separation
between local individuals and their federal representatives (European Greens
2000). Age, formality, and membership
expansion have been major contributing factors to these structural
changes. Concerned with “pulling
out of the mire” that has come with their national coalition with SPD in
government, the German Greens have resolved to draft a new Federal Green
Program by 2001. For many ‘fundis’
this may represent the last hope to salvaging the integrity of the four
fundamental pillars of the original Program. While ‘fundis’ continue to
reject this digression of the Greens into the mainstream, the Green ‘realos’
speak of pragmatic solutions and the challenges of ‘Realpolitik’. Stressing the importance of this new
Program, joint spokesperson of the Greens Gunda Roestel says that, “we have
to decide whether we want to be a footnote of history, or a fixture.”
(Gateway 1999) Regardless of the outcome, this new Program will symbolize the
German Greens’ massive transformation from a radical ‘anti-party party’ to a
formal political party given the challenging task of ruling a new
Germany. This change is witnessed
by the words of Roestel, who warned the party “that voters' approval is not
always automatic.” In their early
days, Die Grunen was regarded as a direct voice for these “voters” who didn’t
concern themselves with catchall politics aimed at gaining public appeal.
(Gateway 1999) While the direction of
the German Greens may be away from their fundamental social and ecological
utopias, their popularity has already provided a landmark example of the
power of grassroots democracy and decentralized organization in a world of
political hierarchy and corporate control. Along the path to political sovereignty, Green Parties
around the world will undoubtedly face many of the same dilemmas faced by Die
Grunen. For the German Greens, there
were many internal and external pressures inherent in their antagonistic role
in power politics that have led them to question their structure, their
methods, and even their four guiding principles of ecology,
social-responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence. Two years ago political pressure led the
party to form a controversial coalition with the Social Democrats. Despite compromising many of their
original goals, they have been able to achieve some significant ecological
and social victories since the coalition.
Along the way, Die Grunen has erected the German Green movement onto
the international political stage.
Their example has contributed in part, to the successful use of Green
politics in the recent globalization protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague,
and Melbourne. It has also elevated
support for Green political parties in Australia, New Zealand, North America,
South America, Africa, Asia, and all over Europe (Greens 2000). Conclusion The Green movement has applied the values of many
social victories of the last three generations, including those of civil
rights and feminism. Taking a
progressive, decentralized approach, the Greens call for an ecological,
nonviolent, non-exploitative society that transcends the linear span of
left-to-right contemporary politics.
The movement calls for a radical change from a political system that
encourages a reactionary, nonideological approach, to a political network
that integrates their legendary phrase, “think globally, act locally.” When describing the limits of decentralization,
ecocentric philosopher Robyn Eckersley explains that insisting too
emphatically on decentralization, local political autonomy, and direct
democracy can compromise the ecocentric goal of social justice. The reason for this is that different
local communities are endowed with different infrastructures and different
levels of resources to meet their basic needs. He also claims that in the right circumstances, “social
hierarchy can provide meaning, identity, and a context that facilitates personal
self-realization.” For Eckersley and for many Green philosophers, the role of
the state is to “represent, address, and resolve” differences within and
across communities. The Green Party
is a good example of Eckersley’s ideal political entity, which disperses
political power “between the center and the periphery (rather than the
concentration of political power in either the center or the periphery) in
order to provide checks and balances in both directions.” (Eckersley 1992, p
152-177) Germany’s democratic political system, like
those of many other Western societies, provides a social hierarchy designed
to represent the interests of political parties. For an individual citizen, an ideal political party would
accurately represent their own interests.
However, existing pressures on political parties have led to the
formation of a small number of highly centralized, non-ideological
institutions designed to promote self-interest over the interests of their
constituency. The Green movement is
based on the concept that giving power to a decentralized population will
break up this concentration of power, causing a shift towards a more
representative democracy and ultimately, more ecological and social
justice. By including Green
principles and a future oriented approach, many Green Parties around the
world represent the most promising instruments of hope that the contemporary
political system has. The question is
whether modern citizens can step outside their existing materialist framework
to accept this new philosophy. Recent
success has given strong evidence to believe that we can. |
Bibliography
Books
Bahro, Rudolf (1986), Building The Green Movement, GMP
Publishers, London. Brown, Bob and Peter
Singer (1996), The Greens, The Text
Publishing Company, Melbourne, Australia. Eckersley, Robyn
(1992), Environmentalism and Political
Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach, State
University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y. Kolinsky, Eva (1989), The Greens in West Germany, Berg
Publishers, Oxford, UK. Hulsberg, Werner
(1988), The German Greens: A Social and
Political Profile, Verso, London. Parkin, Sara (1989), Green Parties: An International Guide,
Heretic Books Ltd., London. Spretnak, Charlene and
Fritjof Capra (1984), Green Politics:
The Global Promise, Paladin Paperback, London. Web Sites
Austin
Community College (2000), Political
Parties, http://www2.austin.cc.tx.us/plane/cr/outlines/oparty.html
Carter,
David (2000), German Greens compromise
to win power,
http://www.greenparty.org.uk/homepage/reports/international/ggCompro.htm
Christian Science
Monitor (1998), German Greens: From
Flower to Power, Sneakers to Wingtips, http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/10/09/p6s2.htm Gaber, Rick (1997), The
Purposes of Third Parties, http://www.freedom.simplenet.com/whatforb.htm Gateway Green Alliance
(1999), Enfeebled German Greens rethink
strategy, http://www.greens.org/s-r/gga/gruenen1.html Germany Info (1998), Coalition Agreement between the SPD and
Alliance 90/The Greens http://www.germany-info.org/newcontent/gp/gp_1b.html Greens (2000), Green Parties world wide, http://www.greens.org/ Greger, Nika (1999), The Environmental Results of the German EU
Council Presidency, American Institute
for Contemporary German Studies, http://aicgs.org/IssueBriefs/greger.html European Greens (2000),
Party Profile: Germany-Die Grunen, http://www.europeangreens.org/germany.html Millennium Debate
(1999), German Greens castigate leaders,
|